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This issue of the Annual Survey of South African Law is
dedicated with gratitude to Professor JT (Jopie) Pretorius
Professor Joseph Thomas Pretorius retired from the University of
South Africa and from Annual Survey at the end of 2017 after an
illustrious career with the journal spanning some 32 years.
Starting as a contributor in 1985, Jopie has throughout been a
driving force behind the continuity and success of Annual Survey.
Apart from authoring the Chapters Negotiable Instruments and
Miscellaneous Contracts, he served on, and since 2007 chaired,
the Editorial Board. As Chair of the Board, Jopie brought his
encyclopaedic knowledge of who’s who in South African law to
bear in drawing together the formidable pool of expertise which
has over the years promoted and maintained the journal’s status
as one of the leading and most authoritative legal sources in the
country. His wisdom in handling the inevitable problems, and the
years of experience that he applied diplomatically in dealing with
academic authors have proven invaluable. He also played a
pivotal and visionary role in mentoring and developing the talent
of several young editors. South African academia and practice
alike owe Professor Pretorius a deep debt of gratitude for his
contribution to law in our country. We are very pleased to
announce that he has agreed to continue serving on Annual
Survey’s Editorial Board.
As the editors of Annual Survey of South African Law, we wish
Jopie every happiness in his retirement, and every success in his
future endeavours, academic and otherwise. May the call of
Wakkerstroom never fade, and may you, Bella, and your children
spend many happy hours wandering the hills.
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And so, with a nod to Leonard Cohen, we must regretfully say:
Now so-long [Jopie-man] it’s time that [you] began to laugh, and
cry, and cry, and laugh, about it all again . . .
Leonard Cohen ‘‘So long Marianne’’ (Project Seven Music 1966)
Neville Botha, Judith Geldenhuys, Jeannie Van Wyk, and
Christian Schulze
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PUBLICATION ETHICS AND PUBLICATION MALPRACTICE
STATEMENT
ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR JOURNAL PUBLICATION
The publication of the peer-reviewed journal Annual Survey of
South African Law contributes to the growth of knowledge.
Therefore, all participants – authors, editors, peer reviewers, and
the publisher – agree on standards of proper ethical behaviour.
The University of South Africa and Juta and Co Ltd, who are
respectively responsible for producing and publishing the jour-
nal, recognise the ethical and other responsibilities and take our
guardianship of the functions connected with the publication of
the journal very seriously.
DUTIES OF AUTHORS
The authors undertake to present an accurate and current
account of legislative and judicial developments and to provide
objective discussion. The material must contain sufficient detail
and permit others to replicate the work. Making fraudulent or
knowingly inaccurate statements is unacceptable. Work reflect-
ing editorial opinion must be acknowledged as such.
The work must be original, and where the work/words of others
have been used this must be appropriately quoted or cited.
Plagiarism in any form is unethical behaviour, and unacceptable.
Authors are not permitted, in general, to publish manuscripts.
Submitting the same manuscript to more than one journal for
publication is unethical and unacceptable, save in exceptional
circumstances where the authors have sought approval from the
editor for publication of the same material in a secondary
publication; in this case, the primary reference must be cited in
the secondary publication.
If an author discovers that his or her published work contains
an inaccuracy, he or she must promptly notify the editor, and
cooperate with the editor to excise or correct the content. If the
editor is informed of an inaccuracy by a third party, the author
must promptly retract or correct the manuscript, or prove that the
original content is correct.
DUTIES OF EDITORS
The editors of the Annual Survey of South African Law are
responsible for deciding whether chapters submitted for publica-
ix
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tion should be accepted. They may be guided by policies of the
editorial board. The editor-in-chief may confer with the other
editors in making a final determination.
The editors must ensure that contributions to the journal appear
in correct English which complies with the style guidelines
prescribed for the journal. The editors evaluate the intellectual
content of manuscripts without regard to gender, race, religious
belief, sexual orientation, citizenship, ethnic origin or the political
inclinations of the authors.
The editorial board will not disclose any information about
chapters submitted for publication to anyone other than the
corresponding author, reviewers, and the publisher as appro-
priate.
Unpublished material submitted by authors may not be used in
the editor’s own research without consent from the author. Editors
must disclose competing interests and publish corrections if the
conflicts of interest are discovered after publication. If required,
other action must be taken, such as retraction of the manuscript
and expression of concern.
The editors take responsibility to respond to ethical complaints
concerning a submitted manuscript or chapter published in the
Annual Survey of South African Law. Any reported complaint,
even if submitted years after publication, will be investigated and
appropriate measures will be taken.
DUTIES OF REVIEWERS
The objective peer review process assists the editor-in-chief in
making editorial decisions, and in improving the quality of the
chapters. Peer review is a key component of scholarly communi-
cation and ensures sound standards of research and proper
acknowledgment of sources used.
Unpublished materials contained in an unpublished manu-
script may not be used in the reviewer’s own research without the
consent of the author. Reviewers must disclose any possible
conflict of interests that may exist, and recuse themselves from
reviews in instances where such a conflict exists.
x ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW
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SENTENCING
ANDRA LE ROUX-KEMP*
LEGISLATION
No legislation impacting directly on this branch of the law was
adopted during the period under review.
CASE LAW
APPROACH APPLICABLE TO THE ENQUIRY INTO THE EXISTENCE OF
SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES
Rugunanan AJ for the High Court Eastern Cape Division,
Grahamstown, in S v Koester (case CC23/2016 [2016] ZAECGHC
60, 12August 2016) summarised the approach to the enquiry into
the existence of substantial and compelling circumstances as
follows (para [3]):
[3.1] A court has a duty to consider all the circumstances of the case
cumulatively, including factors traditionally taken into account,
such as the personal circumstances of the accused, the crime
committed and the legitimate interests of society; this aims at
testing the proportionality of the prescribed sentence (Luthando
Mqikela v S No 119/07 (ECHC), delivered 26 October 2009);
[3.2] For the circumstances to qualify as substantial and compelling,
they need to be exceptional in the sense of seldom encountered
or rare, nor are they limited to those which have a diminishing
effect on the moral guilt of an offender;
[3.3] The Act is intended to ensure a severe, standardised and
consistent response from the courts unless there were truly
convincing reasons for a different response. Put different, the
mandatory sentences are to be regarded as generally appro-
priate for the specified crimes and should not be departed from
without weighty justification; and
[3.4] Where a court is convinced, after considering all the circum-
stances, that the imposition of the minimum sentence would be
unjust, only then is it entitled to characterise the circumstances
as substantial and compelling.
* BA LLB (Stell), CML (UNISA), LLD (Stell), BMus (UNISA) Hons BMus
(UNISA). Assistant Professor at the School of Law, City University of Hong Kong;
Visiting Research Scholar at the School of Law, University of theWitwatersrand.
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ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND INTOXICATION: MITIGATING OR
AGGRAVATING FACTORS?
With regard to the role of alcohol consumption and intoxication
in the commission of a crime, it is interesting to note that,
depending on the specific circumstances of the case, it can
either be a mitigating or an aggravating factor. (For example, see
S v Ndhlovu (2) 1965 (4) SA 692 (A) where the intoxication of the
accused was an aggravating factor, and the following three
cases where it was held to be a mitigating factor: S v Matjeke
(case 049/2016 [2016] ZAGPJHC 129, 7 June 2016; S v Johnson
1969 (1) SA 201 (A); and S v Alam 2006 (2) SACR 613 (Ck).)
APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE BY THE STATE, REPRESENTED BY THE
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL
An appeal against sentence to the Supreme Court of Appeal
can be brought by the prosecution in terms of section 316B of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 if the sentence was imposed
by a superior court sitting as court of first instance and not as a
court of appeal (Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v
Mphaphama 2016 (1) SACR 495 (SCA) para [8]; Director of
Public Prosecutions v Olivier 2006 (1) SACR 380 (SCA)). It is also
possible to bring an appeal under section 311 of the Criminal
Procedure Act, but this provision is only available where a
provincial or local division of the High Court has, on appeal, given
a decision in favour of the person convicted on a question of law
(Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Mphaphama 2016 (1)
SACR 495 (SCA) para [6]). However, regard must also be had to
S v Mosterd 1991 (2) SACR 636 (T), where it was held that a
sentence imposed can never be a question of law decided in
favour of a convicted person (640c-d). The Supreme Court of
Appeal in Mphaphama (above) was in agreement with this
decision: ‘[C]ertainly, when it comes to the exercise of a judicial
discretion in favour of a convicted person in regard to sentence,
that cannot be a question of law decided in his or her favour’
(para [11]).
Sections 16(1)(b) and 17(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Superior Courts
Act 10 of 2013 do not apply to appeals regulated by the Criminal
Procedure Act, or in terms of any other criminal procedural law
(Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Mphaphama 2016 (1)
SACR 495 (SCA) para [9]; Van Wyk v S, Galela v S 2015 (1) SACR
1148 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2016)
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584 (SCA)). Thus, the state cannot rely on the provisions of the
Superior Courts Act in appealing an order (including a sentence)
of the High Court on appeal to it from the regional court, to the
Supreme Court of Appeal (Director of Public Prosecutions,
Gauteng v Mphaphama 2016 (1) SACR 495 (SCA)).
Also see Gonya v S (case 891/15 [2016] ZASCA 34, 24 March
2016) and De Villiers v S & another case 20732/14 [2016] ZASCA
38, 24 March 2016).
NOTEWORTHY SPECIFIC SENTENCES
Determining a suitable sentence has been described as the
most difficult part of a criminal proceeding. For example, in S v
Ngcobo 2016 (2) SACR 436 (KZP), Judge Poyo Dlwati described
it as ‘a lonely and onerous task in the criminal justice system’
(para [1]). Not only does the sentencing stage of the criminal
proceeding involve the interpretation and application of general
principles of sentencing as well as specific statutory prescrip-
tions, but the judicial officer is also required to undertake a value
judgment, weighing contradictory factors and opposing interests.
The punishment must, furthermore, be particularised and tailor-
made so as to ensure that justice is served for the accused and
the complainant(s) in that particular case, and that it also serves
the interests of the public generally. A number of interesting
judgments during the period under review, relating to specific
sentencing options and related considerations are discussed
below.
Committal to a treatment centre
In terms of section 296 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a court
may, in addition to or in lieu of any sentence, order that a person
be detained at a treatment centre established under the Preven-
tion of and Treatment for Substance Abuse Act 70 of 2008 (the
PTSAAct), if the court is satisfied on the evidence before it, which
must include a report by a probation officer, that the offender is an
involuntary service user. An involuntary service user is defined in
section 1 of the PTSAAct as follows:
Involuntary service user means a person who has been admitted to a
treatment centre upon being –
(a) convicted of an offence and has in addition to or in lieu of any
sentence in respect of such offence been committed to a
treatment centre or community based treatment service by a
court;
1149SENTENCING
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(b) committed to an in-patient treatment centre by way of a court
order after such court has held an enquiry; or
(c) transferred from a prison, child and youth care centre, alternative
care or health establishment, for treatment of and rehabilitation for
substances.
In order for a competent order to be made under this provision,
the court must comply with sections 33 and 35 of the PTSA Act,
which were summarised as follows in S v Kemp (case 44/2016
[2016] ZAECGHC 58, 17 February 2016 para [19]):
a. It must be satisfied that the accused is an involuntary service user
living within the court’s jurisdiction.
b. It must be satisfied that the accused is a danger to himself or to
the immediate environment, or that he causes a major public
health risk or in any other manner does harm to his own or the
welfare of his family and others, or that he has committed a
criminal act to sustain his dependence on substances.
c. To this effect an enquiry must be held in the accused’s presence,
at which enquiry the prosecutor and the accused (or his represen-
tative) are entitled to lead evidence and to cross examine
witnesses.
d. A report from a social worker as contemplated in terms of section
33(4) of the Act must be placed before the magistrate regarding
the social circumstances of the accused and any other matter
which the prosecutor may consider relevant, and the accused or
his legal representative must be afforded the opportunity to
examine or cross-examine the deponent to the report.
e. If it appears to the magistrate on consideration of the evidence
and of the social worker’s report that the accused is a person
referred to hereinbefore and as contemplated in section 33(1) of
the Substance Abuse Act, and that he requires and is likely to
benefit from treatment and skills development provided in a
treatment centre, or that it would be in the accused’s interest or in
the interests of his dependants or the community that he be
admitted to a centre, the magistrate may order that the accused
be admitted to a treatment centre (ie a private or public treatment
centre registered or established for the treatment and the rehabili-
tation of service users who abuse or are dependent on sub-
stances) designated by the Director-General (ie the head of the
Department of Social Development in the national sphere of
government), for a period not exceeding 12 months.
f. The magistrate may in addition order that the accused be
admitted in custody or that he be released on bail or on warning
until such time as effect can be given to the court order.
g. A magistrate who makes an order referring an accused to a
treatment centre must, before such referral, order that the accused
be admitted for detoxification at a health establishment or a
treatment centre authorised to provide detoxification in terms of
1150 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2016)
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the National Health Act 61 of 2003 (ie a medically supervised
process by which physical withdrawal from a substance is
managed through administration of individually prescribed medi-
cines by a medical practitioner in such a health establishment or
treatment centre).
A court may also postpone making an order committing an
offender to a treatment centre for a period not exceeding three
years, and may then release the offender on condition that he or
she submits to the supervision of a social worker or a probation
officer specialising in substance abuse, and undergoes any
treatment prescribed by such a supervisor (ss 39 and 40 of the
PTSAAct). Where a court has referred an offender to a treatment
centre and that offender is later found to be unfit for treatment in
such a facility, the court may reconsider and impose a different
punishment in terms of section 276A(4) of the Criminal Procedure
Act.
The accused in S v Kemp (above) pleaded guilty and was
convicted on a charge of malicious injury to property. It was not
disputed that he had a drug addiction problem and was under
the influence of tik and mandrax when he committed the offence.
The sentence imposed by the regional court magistrate on
24 April 2014, therefore, indicated that the accused be admitted
to a rehabilitation centre under section 296(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Act read with section 36 of the PTSA Act. It was
specifically required that the Director-General of the Department
of Social Development identify the rehabilitation centre and
arrange for the admission of the accused, and that the accused
be detained at St Albans prison pending his referral and removal
to this centre (paras [1] [2]). However, during November 2015,
the accused’s erstwhile legal representative discovered that the
accused was still being detained at the St Albans prison, ‘despite
the fact that his detention warrant had reflected the nature of the
sentence, and despite the fact that the prison authorities and his
probation officer had been informed thereof’ (para [3]). The
accused was consequently requisitioned to appear before the
sentencing magistrate where it transpired that ‘the Director-
General of Social Development had never received the documen-
tation to make the referral in terms of the PTSA Act, and that
between the Department of Social Development and the Depart-
ment of Correctional Services ‘‘the case basically fell through the
cracks’’ ’ (para [12]). The regional magistrate thereupon sent the
matter on special review, having concluded that ‘despite his best
1151SENTENCING
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efforts to provide for a sentencing regime which would empha-
sise the accused’s rehabilitation, and despite the intention of the
legislature in providing for such a sentencing option, it appeared
that executively no structure had been put in place to make
provision for such a sentence to be carried out effectively’ (para
[13]).
In considering the sentence imposed and the unfortunate
progression of events, Stretch J for the High Court, Eastern Cape
Division, Grahamstown, held that the sentence should have been
much more precise and detailed, to fully and clearly meet the
requirements of section 33 of the PTSA Act. For example, the
sentence should have specified that the admission to the treat-
ment centre not exceed twelve months and that the accused be
admitted for detoxification in advance as per the provisions of the
PTSA Act (para [27]). He also noted that the Director-General is
usually only tasked with designating a treatment centre, and the
logistics of the actual transfer of an offender are matters which
ought to be arranged by the prosecutor acting in conjunction with
the prison authorities and those responsible for the admission of
the accused at the designated treatment centre (para [27]). Yet,
while Judge Stretch agreed that this case ‘reeks of lamentable
inefficiency, of indifference and of a dereliction of duty’, it was
also not altogether clear where the blame lay (para [28]). Given
the serious nature of the offence committed by the accused, and
the fact that it was not confirmed that he had since been
rehabilitated, the matter was referred back to the regional magis-
trate for sentencing afresh (paras [32]-[35]).
Correctional supervision and community service
The Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 defines ‘community
corrections’ as ‘all non-custodial measures and forms of supervi-
sion applicable to persons who are subject to such measures
and supervision in the community and who are under the control
of the Department’. ‘Correctional supervision’, in turn, is defined
as ‘a form of community corrections contemplated in Chapter VI’
of that Act. Correctional supervision can be imposed as an
independent sentence under section 276(1)(h) and (i) of the
Criminal Procedure Act, or as a condition of suspension of a
sentence, or when a sentence is postponed (S v Van Wyk case
53/2015 [2016] ZAFSHC 59, 7 April 2016 para [12]). A report by a
correctional official should be obtained before sentence is
imposed, and the sentencing court must determine the period of
correctional supervision and its essential elements (para [12]).
1152 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2016)
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Correctional supervision must be distinguished from commu-
nity service, which is defined in the Correctional Services Act as
‘compulsory work for the community organisation or other compul-
sory work of value to the community, performed without payment’.
Community service can be imposed if a sentence is postponed,
or where a sentence is passed but the operation of the whole or
part thereof is suspended on certain conditions, including the
performance of community service (para [15]). An order impos-
ing community service as a sentence on an accused must be
practical and formulated in a clear and unambiguous manner,
particularly as regards the duration, extent, and nature of the
community service (para [16]).
Section 60 of the Correctional ServicesAct relates to sentences
where community service is set as part of community corrections
as described above. And it requires, where a condition of
community service is set as part of community correction, that the
sentencing court stipulate the number of hours which the offender
is required to serve, which shall not be less than sixteen hours per
month, unless the court directs otherwise. The court, the Correc-
tional Supervision and Parole Board, or any other body with the
authority to impose community service, must further specify
where such community service is to be performed, and where it
has not done so, the Supervision Committee established in terms
of section 58 of the Act must specify that place. Only the body
which imposed the community service may alter it, unless that
body, for example the court or the Correctional Supervision and
Parole Board, provided for the order to be altered by the
Supervision Committee.
Daffue J for the High Court Free State Division, Bloemfontein,
agreed with the trial magistrate that the absence of proper
legislation and a credible infrastructure for a sentence of commu-
nity service not only raise practical obstacles to the imposition
of this sentence, but also leave community service standing
‘on constitutionally shaky ground’ (para [21]). It is, therefore,
of particular importance that sentencing courts request a pre-
sentence report in this regard, and that the content of this report
is confirmed by viva voce evidence so that it forms part of the
court record (para [21]). Moreover, courts cannot abdicate their
responsibilities in respect of sentencing to other institutions, such
as the Department of Correctional Services or the National
Institute for Crime Prevention and Re-integration of Offenders, the
former applying only to a sentence of community correction. The
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nature, duration, and place of performance of any community
service order remains the prerogative of the sentencing court (or
other body imposing the sentence) and must be formulated in a
clear and unambiguous manner that is both explicit and possible
to execute.
In Gebert v S [2016] ZAFSHC 114, it was held that correctional
supervision is not an appropriate sentencing option for a for-
eigner not usually resident in South Africa. The appellant in this
matter pretended to be dead so as to enable his wife to submit a
death claim in the amount of R5 million to his life insurer, Old
Mutual Life Assurance (Pty) Ltd (para [2]). However, after investi-
gating the matter, the insurer discovered that the appellant was
still alive. The appellant was sentenced to ten years’ imprison-
ment, of which two years were conditionally suspended for three
years – ie, an effective term of eight years’ imprisonment (para
[8]). The appellant submitted that this sentence induced a sense
of shock and was therefore not in accordance with justice (para
[18]).
As mitigating factors, the sentencing court took the following
into account: the fact that the appellant was a first offender; was
40 years of age; was a businessman who employed 30 persons;
and was financially responsible for his wife, mother-in-law, and
two dependant minor children. It was also noted that despite the
appellant’s fraudulent scheme, the insurer ultimately suffered no
actual financial loss (para [21]). The aggravating factors consid-
ered by the sentencing court included the seriousness of the
offence committed, and the general prevalence of this crime
(fraud) within the regional jurisdiction of the court. It was also
noted that the monetary amount involved was very high, and
although the insurer had not suffered actual financial loss, the
potential prejudice remained high. Finally, it was observed that
the modus operandi of the fraudulent scheme had been meticu-
lously planned, that public interest required that society be
protected from fraudsters, and that those who have committed
such crimes suffer retribution (para [22]).
As the appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of fraud, Ram-
pai J, writing for the majority of the High Court Free State Division,
Bloemfontein, noted the general principle that a court is inextrica-
bly bound to sentence an offender in accordance with the factual
matrix set out in that offender’s plea (para [12]). It was empha-
sised that fraud is a serious crime, but that it is also often dubbed
a ‘white collar’ crime and tendencies can sometimes be observed
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to punish fraudsters more leniently (para [15]; S v Sadler [2000]
All SA 121 (A)). With regard to the appellant’s submission that the
trial court had not adequately considered correctional supervi-
sion as an appropriate sentencing option, it was held that the
primary focus of correctional supervision, as set out in section
276 of the Criminal Procedure Act, is rehabilitation (para [13]).
The introduction of the concept of correctional supervision of
offenders as a sentencing option was further described as ‘a
significant milestone in the reformative process of humanising the
criminal justice system’ (para [13]). And through its introduction,
the courts have been called upon to distinguish between two
types of offender: those who ought to be removed from society
and imprisoned; and those who deserve punishment, but do not
deserve to be removed from society and imprisoned (para [13]).
Moreover, in S v Siebert 1998 (1) SACR 554 (SCA), it was held
that it would amount to a misdirection, if a court were to exclude
outright, correctional supervision as a sentencing option without
a sufficient factual matrix substantiating and justifying such an
ab initio exclusion (para [28]).
Therefore, in considering the facts of the present case, Judge
Rampai also emphasised, in addition to the mitigating and
aggravating factors above, the fact that the appellant was a
foreigner in South Africa in every sense of the word – he had no
permanent physical residential address in South Africa, he was a
Mauritian national, and his family resided in Lesotho (para [29]).
This is particularly problematic as a fixed address is a basic
requirement for a convicted offender placed under correctional
supervision, so as to allow for correctional supervision officers to
monitor him or her. The court held that it would not be lawfully
possible to monitor a foreigner who usually resides in another
country (para [30]). It was for this reason that the appellant was
not a suitable candidate to be sentenced in terms of section
276(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act (para [30]).
With regard to the appellant’s submission that the trial court
had also not adequately considered the paramount interests of
his dependant minor children when it imposed the custodial
sentence, Judge Rampai found that the appellant was not the
children’s primary caregiver, and that they would not be destitute.
Moreover, the appellant and his wife were business partners and
she was still active in caring for both the children and the
businesses (paras [32]-[37]).
However, the court conceded that the regional magistrate
had placed too heavy an emphasis on the seriousness and
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magnitude of the crime, and the view that the appellant ought to
be subject to retribution (para [50]). The sentence was conse-
quently disturbingly shocking and warranted interference on
appeal (paras [51] [53]). The effective term of eight years’
imprisonment was consequently set aside and substituted with a
term of four years’ imprisonment (para [54]).
Postponement of sentence
Section 297 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for the
conditional or unconditional postponement of a sentence, the
suspension of a sentence, and also for caution and reprimand
as sentencing options in criminal proceedings. Section 297(1)
specifically deals with the postponement of sentence, and sec-
tion 297(1)(i) empowers a court, having convicted an offender of
an offence for which the law has not prescribed a minimum
punishment, to postpone the passing of sentence and release the
person concerned on one of more conditions for a period not
exceeding five years. The conditions imposed are within the
discretion of the court and may include a compensation order,
that the accused undergo treatment, compulsory attendance at
or residence in some specific centre, or that the accused
perform, without remuneration and outside of a prison, some
service for the benefit of the community (s 297(1)(i)(aa)-(hh)).
Where a sentence is postponed subject to conditions, the court
must also order that the accused appear before the court on the
expiry of the relevant period.
The unconditional postponement of sentence is provided for in
section 297(1)(ii) and empowers a court to postpone passing of
sentence unconditionally but, as with the postponement of sen-
tence upon conditions, the court must also order the accused to
appear before it if called upon to do so before the expiry of the
relevant period.
Thus, in S v Thabethe & another (case A368/2016 [2016]
ZAGPPHC 513, 24 May 2016), Mothle J for the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria, held that the postponement of a
sentence under section 297(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act
must address the following essential elements (para [8]):
a. The period of postponement may not exceed 5 years.
b. The postponement must be either conditionally (section
297(1)(a)(i)) or unconditionally (section 297(1)(a)(ii).
c. Whether the postponement is conditionally or unconditionally, the
sentence must include an order for the accused person to appear
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before the court either on a specified date ‘at the expiration of the
relevant period’ (conditional postponement) or when called upon
to do so ‘before the expiration of the relevant period’ (uncondi-
tional postponement).
d. When a sentence is postponed conditionally, the conditions of
postponement must be specified.
Sentencing upon conviction relating to offences under the Firearms
Control Act 60 of 2000
The now repealed Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969, which
was in force when the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
was enacted, made no distinction in respect of the type of firearm
when it penalised possession of arms or ammunition without a
licence. Likewise, the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
also draws no distinction between the unlawful possession of, for
example, an automatic or semi-automatic firearm, or between a
semi-automatic firearm and other types of firearm such as a
heavy calibre revolver or pump action shotgun, which can be
regarded as semi-automatic but which is more powerful than a
small calibre semi-automatic pistol (Delport v S 2016 (2) SACR
281 (WCC) paras [3] [4]). In terms of the Criminal Law Amend-
ment Act 105 of 1997, a minimum sentence of fifteen years’
imprisonment is prescribed for a first conviction on any offence
relating to the possession of an automatic or semi-automatic
firearm, explosives, or armament; and minimum sentences of
twenty years and twenty-five years respectively, are prescribed
for second- and third-time offenders (Delport v S above para [2]).
However, the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, which replaced
Act 75 of 1969, distinguishes between the possession of a firearm,
including a semi-automatic firearm, without a licence in contraven-
tion of section 3 of the Act, and possession of a fully automatic
firearm in contravention of section 4(1)(a) of theAct. These types of
firearm are defined as follows in section 1 of the Act:
‘firearm’ means any –
(a) device manufactured or designed to propel a bullet or projectile
through a barrel or cylinder by means of burning propellant, at a
muzzle energy exceeding 8 joules (6 ft-lbs);
(b) device manufactured or designed to discharge rim-fire, centre-
fire or pin-fire ammunition;
(c) device which is not at the time capable of discharging any bullet
or projectile, but which can be readily altered to be a firearm
within the meaning of paragraph (a) or (b);
(d) device manufactured to discharge a bullet or any other projectile,
but which can be readily altered to be a firearm within the
meaning of paragraph (a) or (b);
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(e) device manufactured to discharge a bullet or any other projectile
of a calibre of 5.6 mm (.22 calibre) or higher at a muzzle energy of
more than 8 joules (6 ft-lbs), by means of compressed gas and
not by means of burning propellant; or
(f) barrel, frame or receiver of a device referred to in paragraphs
(a)–(b), (c) or (d), but does not include a muzzle loading firearm
or any device contemplated in section 5;
‘fully automatic’ means capable of discharging more than one shot
with a single depression of the trigger;
. . .
‘muzzle loading firearm’ means –
(a) a barrelled device that can fire only a single shot, per barrel and
requires after each shot fired the individual reloading through the
muzzle end of the barrel with separate components consisting
of a –
(i) measured charge of black powder or equivalent propellant;
(ii) wad; and
(iii) lead bullet, sabot or shot functioning as projectile,
and ignited with a flint, match, wheel or percussion cap;
. . .
‘semi automatic’ means self-loading but not capable of discharging
more than one shot with a single depression of the trigger; . . .
While the Criminal LawAmendment Act 105 of 1997 prescribes
a minimum term of fifteen years’ imprisonment for the unlawful
possession of a firearm, including a semi-automatic firearm (first
offender), the provisions of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000
prescribe a maximum term of fifteen years’ imprisonment for
unlawful possession of a firearm, including a semi-automatic
firearm, and a maximum term of twenty-five years’ imprisonment
for offences relating to ‘prohibited firearms’ (ss 3 and 4 and
Schedule 4 to the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000). This disparity
between the provisions of the two Acts has been the subject of
controversy and discordant judicial interpretation by the courts
(Delport v S above para [2]). For example, in S v Sukwazi 2002 (1)
SACR 619 (N), it was concluded that the offence of unlawfully
possessing a semi-automatic firearm was not subject to the
minimum-sentence legislation, and this decision has subse-
quently been endorsed in a number of High Court judgments –
see, eg, S v Mooleele 2003 (2) SACR 255 (T); S v Radebe 2006
(2) SACR 604 (O); and S v Manana 2007 (1) SACR 62 (T). And
despite the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Thembalethu 2009 (1)
SACR 50 (SCA) rejecting the conclusion reached in Sukwazi, the
latter judgment was nevertheless favourably cited in Asmal v S
[2015] ZASCA 122 paragraph [6], and Delport v S above
paragraph [5].
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Binns-Ward J and Klopper AJ for the High Court Western Cape
Division, Cape Town, addressed this anomaly in Delport v S
(above) by way of a close reading of the provisions of the
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000. While the judges noted that the
seemingly ‘bifurcated sentencing regime’ may be the result of ‘a
lack of astuteness’ on the part of the legislature, they nonetheless
inferred from the provisions of the Act that ‘the legislature regards
the unlicensed possession of ‘‘prohibited firearms’’ as a signifi-
cantly more serious evil than that of the unlicensed possession of
semi-automatic firearms. . .’ (paras [13] [15] [18] referring to
Madikane v S 2011 (2) SACR 11 (ECG)). However, Judges
Binns-Ward and Klopper ultimately agreed with the finding in
Swartz v S ([2014] ZAWCHC 113, 4 August 2014), decided by a
full bench of the same court and therefore binding, in which it was
held that the phrase ‘notwithstanding any other law’ in section 1 of
the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 38 of 2007, which
replaced section 51 of Act 105 of 1997, ‘served as clear
confirmation that the special minimum sentence provisions were
intended to trump the general penalty provisions in the Firearms
Control Act 60 of 2000’ (para [17]).
The court also noted the following general points with regard to
the determination of an appropriate sentence for contraventions
of the provisions of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000:
• Sentences passed in terms of the previous Arms and Ammu-
nition Act 75 of 1969 have little relevance today, as this statute
dates back to a time of serious and violent manifestations of
crime during which the use of fully automatic weapons was
common (para [36]).
• Sentencing an offender for the unlawful possession of an
unlicensed firearmmust be treated separately from the punish-
ment warranted for having used that weapon in the commis-
sion of an offence. The court explained that ‘[i]n such matters
it is the cumulative effect of the sentences imposed, rather
than whether a heavier sentence should be imposed for the
unlawful possession of the firearm, that should be the more
relevant consideration’ (para [37]).
• Further, in assessing the gravity to be attached to the offence
of unlawful possession of firearms, the court held that regard
must be had to ‘the objects inherent in the creation of the
statutory offences and the attendant sanctions, namely the
prevention of crime and the disincentivising of the unlawful
possession of firearms in a country in which the proliferation of
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the possession of illegally possessed firearms has become,
and continues to be, a very menacing evil’ (para [38]).
Disparity in sentences of co-accused
The three appellants in Tladi & others v S 2016 (1) SACR 424
(GP) were each convicted on one count of kidnapping and one
count of rape, and each sentenced to four years’ imprisonment
on the kidnapping count. In respect of the second count of rape,
the first and third appellants were sentenced to fifteen years’
imprisonment, while the second appellant was sentenced to five
years’ imprisonment (para [1]). The disparity in the sentences
imposed for the second count was primarily based on the age of
the appellants: the first appellant was 28 years of age and the
third appellant was twenty years of age. The second appellant,
who was only sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for his role in
the rape of the complainant, was seventeen years and eleven
months old at the time of the commission of the offence (paras
[8]-[12]). With approximately one year’s age difference between
the second and third appellants, this disparity in sentences was
not justified (para [16]). And, while a disparity in the sentences of
co-accused will not necessarily warrant interference on appeal,
the degree of disparity in this instance was held to be disturbing
enough to justify the interference of the appeal court (para [17]).
With very little information provided by the sentencing court to
justify the disparity in sentences, the appeal court considered the
facts and circumstances of the case anew, together with the
aggravating and mitigating factors for each appellant. It was
ultimately ordered that the first appellant’s sentence on the rape
count be increased to life imprisonment, the second appellant’s
sentence to fifteen years’ imprisonment, and the third appellant’s
sentence remain at fifteen years’ imprisonment. The sentences
imposed on the rape counts were furthermore ordered to run
concurrently with the four-year term imposed for the count of
kidnapping (para [23]).
RAPE AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (SEXUAL OFFENCES
AND RELATED MATTERS) AMENDMENT ACT 105 OF 1997
The three appellants in Ngcobo & others v S (case AR759/14
[2016] ZAKZPHC 26, 3 March 2016), were convicted on two
counts of robbery with aggravating circumstances, and the first
appellant was also convicted on two counts of rape. It was the
same woman who had been raped by the first appellant on two
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separate occasions relating to the robbery incidents. Given that
the first appellant had raped the same woman more than once,
the regional magistrate stopped the proceedings after conviction
in terms of section 52(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences
and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007, and committed
the appellants to the High Court for sentencing (paras [1]-[3]).
Section 52(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and
Related Matters) Amendment Act requires that an accused who
has been convicted of an offence referred to in Part 1 of Schedule
2 to the Act, be committed to the High Court for sentencing. Rape
under Part 1 of Schedule 2, includes:
Rape –
(a) when committed –
(i) in circumstances where the victim was raped more than once
whether by the accused or by any co-perpetrator or accom-
plice;
(ii) by more than once person, where such persons acted in the
execution or furtherance of a common purpose or con-
spiracy;
(iii) by a person who has been convicted of two or more offences
of rape but has not yet been sentenced in respect of such
convictions; or
(iv) by a person knowing that he has the acquired immune
deficiency syndrome or the human immunodeficiency virus;
(b) where the victim –
(i) is a girl under the age of 16 years;
(ii) is a physically disabled woman who due to her physical
disability is rendered particularly vulnerable; or
(iii) is a mentally ill woman as contemplated in section 1 of the
Mental Health Act 18 of 1973; or
(c) involving the infliction of grievous bodily harm.
It was the opinion of the magistrate that the rapes in this case
fell within item (a)(i) of Part I of Schedule 2 to the Act, ‘because
they were committed ‘‘in circumstances where the victim was
raped more than once whether by the accused or by any
co-perpetrator or accomplice’’ ’ (para [5]). Legal counsel for the
first appellant objected to this, and submitted that this provision
could not be read to apply to the present case as the victim had
been raped on two separate occasions some six weeks apart
(para [5]). Choudree AJ for the High Court agreed with this
submission and referred the matter back to the regional court for
sentencing (para [5]). However, it was then found in the regional
court that the rapes indeed fell within the ambit of Part 1 of
Schedule 2, not for the reason previously thought, but because
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this was a case of rape committed by a person who had been
convicted of two or more offences of rape, but had not yet been
sentenced in respect of such convictions (ie, item (a)(iii) of Part I
of Schedule 2 (para [6]). The first appellant was subsequently
sentenced to life imprisonment on two counts of rape, and to
fifteen years’ imprisonment on each of the counts of robbery
(para [7]). Counsel for both the appellant and the state disagreed
with this finding and the sentence imposed for the rape convic-
tions, and submitted that the rapes in this case did not fall within
either of the provisions of Part I of Schedule 2, that the referral to
the High Court was therefore not competent, and that the High
Court, in the circumstances, lacked jurisdiction to sentence the
appellants (para [9]).
On appeal, Olsen J, writing for the majority of the KwaZulu-
Natal Division, Pietermaritzburg, held, with regard to item (a)(iii)
of Part I of Schedule 2 to the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and
Related Matters) Amendment Act, that ‘[t]he language of that item
conveys clearly that a rape which falls within it is one committed
by a person who has already been convicted of two or more prior
offences of rape but has not yet been sentenced in respect of
those convictions. The language permits of no other construction’
(para [10]). In this case, the first appellant had not previously
been convicted of a rape when he committed these two rapes
and his conviction and sentence could, therefore, not fall within
item (a)(iii) of Part I of Schedule 2 (para [13]). Likewise, the court
concluded that the rape could also not fall within the ambit of
(a)(i) of Part 1 of Schedule 2 as this provision referred to a victim
having been ‘raped more than once in the course of an unbroken
chain of events which might be referred to as a single incident.
Such a single incident might involve multiple rapes perpetrated
one immediately after the other; or, for instance, multiple rapes
during the course of a prolonged but uninterrupted abduction’
(para [14]). This item was also not applicable in the present
matter, as the first appellant in this case had committed two rapes
on the same victim, but on the occasion of two separate and
distinct robberies committed six weeks apart (para [14]).
Indeed, and in the words of the judges of the KwaZulu-Natal
Division, Pietermaritzburg, ‘Schedule 2 to Act 105 of 1997 is not a
model of clarity’ (para [12]). In coming to this conclusion, Judge
Olsen relied on S v Kimberley & another 2005 (2) SACR 663
(SCA) paragraph [13], in which the following guidelines were laid
down for interpreting Part I of Schedule 2 (see too Ngcobo &
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others v S (case AR759/14 [2016] ZAKZPHC 26, 3 March 2016
para [21]):
(a) The court ‘will interpret the paragraphs so as to render an
interpretation least harsh to the affected person’.
(b) Where a statutory provision which is not clear changes the
common law it must be interpreted restrictively.
(c) ‘More particularly statutes which prescribe minimum sentences,
such as the statute here under consideration, thus eliminating the
usual discretion of a court to impose a sentence which befits the
peculiar circumstances of each individual case, will usually be
construed in such a way that the penal discretion remains intact
as far as possible.’
Judge Olsen explained that the first count of rape in this case
took place in circumstances where there was no second rape,
and it cannot, therefore, attract the imposition of a minimum
sentence of life imprisonment (para [24]). He said: ‘The words
‘‘where the victim was raped more than once’’ define those
circumstances. More than one rape must take place at the time
when the rape in question (the one which is to attract the life
sentence) takes place. The rape has to have been committed ‘‘in
circumstances’’ where the victim ‘‘was raped more than once’’ ’
(para [25]).
Given that the two rape convictions of the first appellant did not
fall under section 52(1)(b)(i) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences
and Related Matters) Amendment Act, the first appellant was
referred back to the regional court for sentencing (para [29]).
Also see D v S (case 89/16 [2016] ZASCA 123, 22 September
2016).
In E v S (case CA & R21/2014 [2016] ZANCHC 51, 9 Septem-
ber 2016) it was again confirmed that the provisions of sections
51 and 52 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related
Matters) Amendment Act do not apply to children under the age
of eighteen years when they committed the offence(s) (para [4]; S
v B 2006 (1) SACR 311 (SCA); Centre for Child Law v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development & others (National Insti-
tute for Crime Prevention and the Re-integration of Offenders as
Curiae) 2009 (2) SACR 477 (CC)).
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN ACCUSED AND HIS/HER CHILD(REN)
AS A RELEVANT FACTOR IN SENTENCING
The respondent in Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng,
Pretoria v Mtshali 2016 (2) SACR 463 (GP) was convicted of rape
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and attempted murder and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment
wholly suspended for a period of five years on the rape count,
and to a fine of R2 000 or twelve months’ imprisonment on the
attempted murder count. On appeal, De Vos J for the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria, noted that the accused was only
convicted on one count of rape, although it appeared from the
facts that the complainant was raped twice (para [1]). These two
rapes happened during the same incident in which the respon-
dent had kidnapped and severely assaulted the complainant but
were some hours apart (para [6]). No explanation was given of
why the respondent was only charged with and convicted of one
count of rape.
With regard to the sentence imposed on the rape count, it
transpired that the trial magistrate was primarily influenced by
two factors in deciding against a sentence of direct imprison-
ment: first, that the respondent was divorced and had custody of
his two minor children; and second, that the pre-sentence report
dealt extensively with the best interest of the respondent’s
children, and how a sentence of direct imprisonment would
impact on them (para [7]). It was argued by the prosecution that
the magistrate had misdirected himself by placing too much
emphasis on the interests of the respondent’s children, and had
also not received sufficient information before trial to substantiate
the findings that the respondent was indeed the children’s
primary caregiver (para [7]).
De Vos J agreed with the prosecution’s submission and held
that the court a quo had ignored the fact that the respondent’s
children were left with their paternal grandmother who looked
after them while the father took up employment elsewhere. The
respondent was, therefore, the primary breadwinner of the family,
but not the primary caregiver (para [7]). Taking into consideration
the best interests of the child or children of an accused at
sentencing requires a proper investigation into what the position
of the children would be were imprisonment to be imposed (para
[7]). Judge De Vos explained: ‘It is clear from the authorities that
sentencing officers cannot always protect children from the
consequences of direct imprisonment. The relationship between
an accused, convicted of serious crimes, and his children [is]
merely one of the factors to be weighed up in each case in
determining a proper sentence. Children cannot be used as an
excuse to avoid incarceration’ (para [8]; S v Chetty 2013 (2)
SACR 142 (SCA)).
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MERCY
In S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A), Holmes JA said the following
of the concept of mercy with regard to sentencing (862D-F):
. . .
(i) It is a balanced and humane state of thought.
(ii) It tempers one’s approach to the factors to be considered in
arriving at an appropriate sentence.
(iii) It has nothing in common with maudlin sympathy for the accused.
(iv) It recognises that fair punishment may sometimes have to be
robust.
(v) It eschews insensitive censoriousness in sentencing a fellow
mortal, and so avoids severity in anger.
(vi The measure of the scope of mercy depends upon the circum-
stances of each case.
This concept of mercy, and its interplay with other consider-
ations in sentencing, including the aims of punishment and the
so-called Zinn-triad – which refers to the personal circumstances
of the accused, the nature of the offence committed, and the
interests of society – were considered in S v Nteta & others 2016
(2) SACR 641 (WCC).
The accused in this case brutally assaulted the deceased and
were ultimately convicted of murder and rape in terms of section
3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters)
Amendment Act. It was found that the death of the deceased was
not only caused by more than one person in the furtherance of a
common purpose, but that the rape also involved grievous bodily
harm (para [22]). The provisions of section 51(3) of the Criminal
Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 therefore applied, and the
prescribed sentence of life imprisonment ought to have been
imposed, unless the court found substantial and compelling
circumstances warranting a deviation from this prescribed sen-
tence (para [23]).
No such substantial and compelling circumstances were found.
With regard to the concept of mercy, Henney J for the High Court
Western Cape Division, Cape Town, emphasised the lack of any
mercy, humanity, or respect the accused showed their victim
(paras [19]-[21]). The accused also showed no remorse for what
they had done (paras [24]-[26]). The prescribed minimum sen-
tences were consequently imposed on the accused, save for
accused number four, who was under the age of eighteen years
when he committed the offence, and who was sentenced to an
effective term of fifteen years’ imprisonment (para [28]).
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EXPRESSING REMORSE AFTER A PLEA OF NOT GUILTY
In Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng, Pretoria v Tsotetsi
([2016] ZAGPHHC 290, 22 April 2016), the DPP applied for leave
to appeal against the sentence imposed on the respondent. The
respondent was convicted on two counts of murder and sen-
tenced, in terms of the provisions of section 51 of the Criminal
Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, to twenty years’ imprisonment
on each count. The two sentences were ordered to run concur-
rently (para [1]).
In deviating from the prescribed sentence of life imprisonment,
the sentencing court observed a number of substantial and
compelling circumstances, including the fact that the respondent
was HIV-positive, was relatively young when the murders were
committed, was a first offender, and had already spent a period
of almost five years in prison awaiting trial (paras [2]-[4]). The
DPP objected, however, claiming that the sentencing court had
downplayed the respondent’s lack of remorse. It was said, for
example, that during her evidence in mitigation of sentence, she
offered an apology to the families of the deceased, but stopped
short of admitting her role in their murder (para [6]). This,
according to the DPP, was indicative of a lack of remorse and also
showed that prospects of rehabilitation were remote (para [6]).
Makgoka J for the High Court Gauteng, Pretoria, did not agree.
He pointed out that the respondent had pleaded not guilty, and
had she expressed remorse in the manner the state would have
preferred, she would have had to change her plea to one of guilty
during argument in mitigation of sentence (para [6]). In S v
Nkomo 2007 (2) SACR 198 (SCA) paragraph [30], it was further
held that there is hardly any person of whom it can be said that
there is no prospect of rehabilitation. Finally, with regard to the
order that the two sentences of twenty years’ imprisonment on
each count run concurrently, it was held that it is a salutary
practice for a sentencing court to consider the cumulative effect
of sentences imposed, and where the relevant offences are
‘inextricably linked in terms of the locality, time, protagonists and,
importantly, the fact that they were committed with one common
intent’ (S v Mokela 2012 (1) SACR 431 (SCA) para [11]), an order
that the sentences should run concurrently is appropriate (Tsotetsi
above para [8]).
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE PROSPECT OF REHABILITATION OF
AN OFFENDER AT SENTENCING
The appellant in Brass v S ([2016] ZAGPPHC 96, 23 February
2016) was convicted of contravening section 4(b) of the Drugs
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and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992; and of being in possession
of four grams of methamphetamine. He was subsequently sen-
tenced to three years’ imprisonment in terms of section 276(1)(i)
of the Criminal Procedure Act, without any option of paying a fine
(para [1]). In an appeal against the sentence, the appellant
submitted that the magistrate had been vindictive in the way in
which he approached sentencing, as he passed a sentence of
imprisonment despite recognising that the appellant was a good
candidate for rehabilitation (paras [3]-[5]).
In determining sentence, the magistrate asked the appellant
questions, the answers to which showed that the appellant had a
drug problem that was harmful to his welfare and to the welfare of
his family, and that he was a person as described in section 33 of
the PTSA Act. In fact, it was clear that the magistrate had no
interest in considering the appellant for rehabilitation (paras
[11]-[13]), despite the provisions of section 296 of the Criminal
Procedure Act which specifically allow a court to consider
rehabilitation in lieu of or in addition to any sentence passed
(para [15]).
It was consequently concluded that the sentence of three
years’ direct imprisonment was shockingly inappropriate. It was
set aside and the matter was referred back to the magistrate’s
court to be dealt with in terms of section 296(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Act (para [24]).
INTERFERENCE OF AN APPEAL COURT IN TERMS OF SECTION 304(4)
OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT 51 OF 1977
The appellant in Masuku v S ([2016] ZAWCHC 77, 23 June
2016) was arraigned on two counts of robbery with aggravating
circumstances, and one count of kidnapping (para [1]). The
appellant had legal representation and pleaded not guilty to all
three charges (para [2]). Particularly important in this case, was
that the appellant had been arrested for these charges on
25 March 1999, but made his first appearance in the regional
court only on 27 March 2001, when it was noted that he was in
custody for another matter (para [4]). The appellant ultimately
changed his plea to one of guilty on all three charges and made a
number of formal admissions in a statement prepared in terms of
section 220 of the Criminal Procedure Act (para [7]). It was on the
basis of these admissions that the appellant was convicted (para
[7]). It was also at the time of this conviction that the appellant’s
attorney informed the court that he was serving two sentences, a
1167SENTENCING
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 16 PAGE: 22 SESS: 15 OUTPUT: Wed May 30 13:20:44 2018
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey16/ch35
sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment which had been imposed in
August 2000, and a sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment which
had been imposed in February 2001 (para [8]).
For the purpose of sentencing, the appellant was considered a
third offender in terms of the counts of robbery. This was because
his two previous convictions were on counts of robbery, numer-
ous counts of kidnapping, as well as various counts of attempted
murder and the possession of a firearm without a licence, and two
counts of theft of a motor vehicle (para [8]). What is more, all
these offences were initially held to have been committed in
March 1999, which was shortly after the offences for which he
was most recently convicted. Yet, it was later accepted that these
offences had been committed even earlier, on 6 November 1997
(para [9]). The Regional Magistrate subsequently sentenced the
appellant to 25 years’ imprisonment on each of the two counts of
robbery and ordered that the sentences run concurrently. The
appellant was also sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment on the
kidnapping count. To further ameliorate the effect of the sen-
tences, the Regional Magistrate ordered that ‘15 years of the
sentences in respect of [the robbery counts] and the entire
sentence in respect of [the kidnapping count] were to run
concurrently with the sentences which were being served by the
appellant at the time . . . [It was also ordered] that the balance of
10 years of the sentences on [the robbery counts] should . . . run
concurrently’ (para [10]). The effect of this was that the appellant
only had to serve an additional ten years on top of the sentences
he was already serving (para [10]).
Thirty-three months after having been sentenced, the appellant
started a barrage of appeals over an extended period (para [11]).
He first submitted that he had been adversely influenced by his
then legal representative to make the admissions and to admit
guilt to the three charges (para [11]). As to the late filing of the
application for leave to appeal, the appellant merely submitted
that ‘it took him some time to find out what to do’ (para [12]).
Sher J, writing for the majority of the High Court Western Cape
Division, Cape Town, found that the application for leave to
appeal and the application for condonation did not comply with
the requirements laid down for such applications (para [13]). The
appeals were subsequently struck from the roll in March 2009
(para [14]). Thereafter, the appellant applied for leave to appeal
against the sentence imposed. In this regard, the appellant
submitted that the overall, cumulative sentence of 50 years’
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incarceration was unduly harsh, and that he had struggled to
raise the necessary funds to pursue the appeal (paras [15]-[17]).
It was also argued that the appellant had erroneously been
sentenced to a minimum term of 25 years on each robbery count
as a third offender of this offence (para [18]). Judge Sher also
rejected this argument, as the dates on which the offences had
been committed and the dates on which the convictions and
sentence had been imposed, clearly showed that the appellant
was a third offender on the count of robbery (para [19]).
A final appeal was lodged in terms of section 304(4) of the
Criminal Procedure Act in which the appellant submitted that he
had been in custody since at least 4 August 2000, when he was
sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment (he was also sentenced to
40 years’ imprisonment on 22 February 2001), and that he could,
therefore, not have committed the offences for which he was
sentenced on 20 December 2002, as he was already in custody
at that time (para [20]).
First, in dealing with the appellant’s reliance on section 304(4)
of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides that ‘where it is
brought to the attention of any provincial or local division that
proceedings in which a sentence was imposed were not in
accordance with justice, the court shall have the same powers in
respect thereof as if the record had been laid before it for the
purposes of so-called automatic review, in terms of s 303’, Judge
Sher held that the provision cannot be used as ‘a back door for
the shrewd, but an emergency exit for the needy’ (para [21]; also
see S v Matsane & ’n ander 1978 (3) SA 821 (T) 823D-E and S v
Singh 2013 (2) SACR 372 (KZD) para [14]).
In this regard, it was emphasised that the appellant had legal
representation at the time of his trial, and that he had made the
admissions freely and voluntarily in terms of the provisions of
section 220 of the Criminal Procedure Act (para [23]). And, even
though the court conceded that it was inconceivable for the
appellant to have committed one of the robberies and kidnap-
pings with which he had been charged, as he was most probably
already in custody at that time, this, according to the court, did
not mean that the appellant did not commit these offences, or that
he was not properly convicted of having committed them (para
[26]). Questions were raised, for example, as to why the appellant
did not bring this to the attention of his legal representative and
the court at the trial a quo (para [27]). A court can only interfere in
terms of section 304(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act if there has
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been an irregularity which has resulted in a failure of justice in the
proceedings a quo. In the present case it was held that the
possible irregularities which may have tainted the trial were not of
such a nature that they would have resulted in the appellant
having had an unfair trial (paras [34] [36]).
SENTENCING IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CASES
Determining a just sentence in a case involving child porno-
graphy is particularly complex. Judges Baqwa and Kubushi for
the High Court Gauteng, Pretoria, remarked in Director of Public
Prosecutions North Gauteng v Alberts 2016 (2) SACR 419 (GP),
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to define exactly what child
pornography is, and it is also impossible fully to grasp its reality –
ie the full extent of its impact and reach (para [12]). The
devastating effects of child pornography are, for example, not
only felt at the local level, but extend and operate much further,
via the internet in cyberspace (para [13]). In Du Toit v The
Magistrate & others 2016 (2) SACR 112 (SCA), Ponnan J, writing
for the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal, explained it as
follows: ‘A child compromised by a pornographer’s camera has
to go through life knowing that the image is probably circulating
within the mass distribution network for child pornography.
Because the child’s actions are reduced to a recorded image, the
pornography may haunt him or her long after the original record-
ing’ (para [14]). In Alberts (above) the court, quoting from an
article on child pornography by Iyavar Chetty, held that
. . . to ensure appropriate sentencing of those convicted of involve-
ment in child pornography acts, the crime should be seen not simply
as the possession or distribution of child abuse images but as the
sexual abuse, exploitation, degradation, and impairment of the dignity
of all children and the promotion of the use of child pornography for
sexual gratification through the portrayal of children as acceptable
sexual objects (para [14]; Iyavar Chetty ‘The trivialisation of child
pornography crimes in South African courts’ KINSAAfrica 2014).
Judges Baqwa and Kubushi held that this perspective on child
pornography has not yet
sufficiently penetrated the South African jurisprudence in regard to
offences against children. [Because] [t]here seems to be a chasm
between the public outrage that is expressed when those offences are
committed and the manner in which the courts articulate that outrage
when sentences are meted out. It is true that sentencing is a balancing
act in that it has to take into account the interests not only of the
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criminal but also to consider the seriousness of the crime and the
interests of society. [However] . . . the court, as the upper guardian of
minor children ought not to be hesitant in protecting the interests
of one of the most vulnerable groups of our society. The courts, . . . are
enjoined by the Constitution to do so. It is not an option which they
may or may not take (para [15]).
The judges, therefore, held that ‘[i]t is an absolute necessity to
understand not only the nature of the crime but also the impact it
has not only on the victim, the victim’s family, but also the society
at large. By society, it must be understood not only the society in
and around the victim but society in a global sense due to the
advances in technology through which images can go around the
world in a matter of seconds’ (para [20]).
The respondent in this case had been a collector of porno-
graphic material involving children for a number of years. His
collection was made online, and he did not have direct contact
with the children, nor did he take the photographs himself. The
court a quo imposed a sentence of five years’ imprisonment on
finding the respondent guilty of 482 charges of possession of
child pornography in contravention of section 27(1)(9) of the
Films and Publications Act 65 of 1996 (para [3]). On appeal, this
sentence was set aside and substituted with a term of ten years’
imprisonment. It was also ordered that the respondent’s name be
recorded in the Register of Sex Offenders as per the provisions of
the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amend-
ment Act (para [40]).
AMELIORATING THE EXTREME CUMULATIVE EFFECTIVE OF SENTENCES
IMPOSED
The appellant in M v S ([2016] ZAECMHC 14, 12 April 2016)
pleaded guilty and was convicted of murder, attempted murder,
and attempted robbery. He was sentenced to an effective term of
30 years’ imprisonment, calculated as follows: twenty years for
murder; fifteen years for attempted murder; and ten years for
attempted robbery. It was further ordered that fifteen years of this
total sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment were to run concurrently
with the sentence that the accused was currently serving for a
conviction on an unrelated offence. Thus, of the total 45 years’
imprisonment, the accused was to spend an effective 30 years in
prison (para [1]). The appellant was granted leave to appeal
against this decision based on the ground that the sentencing
court had erred in not taking into account his youth at the time of
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the commission of the offences (he was fifteen years and eleven
months old at that time), and that whatever terms of imprisonment
the court imposed in respect of each of the offences ‘should run
concurrently with each other taking into consideration that they all
flowed from the same incident and that such sentence should be
antedated’ to the date on which the appellant was sentenced,
which was 20 May 2004 (para [4]).
Bloem J for the High Court Eastern Cape Local Division,
Mthatha, agreed that the sentencing court had failed sufficiently
to consider the appellant’s youth at the time of the commission of
the offences, and that this constituted a misdirection (para [7]). It
was held that the mere remark that ‘people [of] the accused’s
age, 16 years and thereabouts, tend to think that because of their
tender age, the courts will not impose heavier [sentences]. If
anybody still thinks so [he or she is] in for a big shock’ does not
constitute a proper consideration of the possible influence that
the appellant’s ‘immature judgment, youthful vulnerability to error,
and impulse and influence’may have had in this regard (paras [4]
[7]; also see Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development (National Institute for Crime Preven-
tion and the Re-integration of Offenders, as Amicus Curiae) 2009
(2) SACR 477 (CC) 490i-491a).
Moreover, it also appeared from the trial record that the
sentencing court was unclear as to the offence of which the
appellant had been convicted, and for exactly how many years
he had been sentenced to imprisonment for that crime (para [8]).
In light of this uncertainty and lack of evidence, it was held to be
unconvincing how the sentencing court could have come to a
reasoned decision and could have exercised a proper judicial
sentencing discretion in ordering that fifteen years of the 45 years’
imprisonment should run concurrently with what was assumed to
be a term of fifteen years’ imprisonment that the appellant was
already serving on an unrelated matter (para [9]).
Judge Bloem, however, agreed with the sentencing court that
on a practical level, the extreme cumulative effect of the sen-
tences imposed is best ameliorated by ordering that the sen-
tences in the present appeal run concurrently with the sentence
imposed on the appellant in terms of his previous conviction
(para [14]). It was consequently ordered that eight years of the
twenty years’ imprisonment imposed on the murder count, and
eight years of the fifteen years’ imprisonment imposed on the
attempted murder count, and the entire ten years’ imprisonment
1172 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SA LAW (2016)
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 16 PAGE: 27 SESS: 15 OUTPUT: Wed May 30 13:20:44 2018
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey16/ch35
imposed on the count of attempted robbery, run concurrently with
the sentence imposed on the appellant in 2002. The sentences
were antedated to 20 May 2004 (para [15]).
SENTENCING AND THE CHILD JUSTICE ACT 75 OF 2008
The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 was enacted on 1 April 2010
and effectively established a criminal justice system for children
in South Africa who are in conflict with the law and are accused of
committing offences. The criminal justice system for minor offend-
ers established under the provisions of this Act, runs parallel to
the ‘main’ criminal justice system, which is regulated primarily by
the Criminal Procedure Act. The main impetus behind the Child
Justice Act and the criminal justice system for minors established
pursuant to its provisions, is to serve and ensure the best
interests of child offenders in South Africa.
When an accused will be regarded as a child in terms of the Child Justice
Act 75 of 2008
In S v Nteta & others 2016 (2) SACR 641 (WCC), Henney J for
the Western Cape Northern Circuit Local Division, Ceres, affirmed
that a person will be regarded as a child for the purpose of
sentencing in terms of the Child Justice Act, if that person was
under the age of eighteen years when the offence was committed
and also at the time of arrest (para [10]). The purpose of section
4(1)(b)(iii) of the Child Justice Act is clear – to provide for a
separate criminal justice system for minors, and also for such
minors to be kept separately from adults whilst in detention (para
[11]). The Act does not, therefore, protect a person who was
under the age of eighteen years when he or she committed the
offence, but had already reached the age of eighteen years or
older at the time of arrest (para [13]). An interpretation to the
contrary could lead to the situation where a child offender would
end up being detained with an adult offender (para [14]). Where
an offender committed the offence whilst still under the age of
eighteen years, but was arrested after having come of age, the
correct approach is rather to consider the age of such an
accused when the offence was committed as a strong mitigating
factor, ie that the accused was at that time still a child in terms of
the law (para [15]).
A just sentence for a youthful offender guilty of a heinous crime
The appellant in S v S ([2016] ZAWCHC 24, 9 March 2016) was
convicted of murder, possession of a firearm in contravention of
1173SENTENCING
JOBNAME: Annual−Survey 16 PAGE: 28 SESS: 15 OUTPUT: Wed May 30 13:20:44 2018
/first/Juta/juta/annual−survey16/ch35
section 3 of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, and possession
of ammunition in contravention of section 90 of the Firearms
Control Act 60 of 2000. The appellant was sentenced to ten years’
imprisonment on the murder charge, three years’ for possession
of a firearm, and one year on the possession of ammunition
charge. The court ordered that the sentences imposed on counts
two and three run concurrently with the sentence on the murder
count (paras [1] [2]). The appellant made use of his automatic
right to appeal in terms of section 84(1)(a) of the Child Justice Act
75 of 2008, and appealed against this sentence on the ground
that it was too harsh given that he was only fifteen years old when
he committed the offences, and only seventeen years of age
when he was sentenced (para [9]).
In considering the appeal, Justice Henney for the High Court
Western Cape Division, Cape Town, restated the rudiments
applicable when a court sentences a child: first, the provisions of
Chapter 10 of the Child Justice Act must be considered. Section
69 of theAct specifically provides for the objectives of sentencing
and the factors that the court must take into consideration (also
see S v LM 2013 (1) SACR 188 (WCC) paras [18] [19]). These
objectives include the following: that the child be encouraged to
understand the implications of, and be held accountable for, the
harm caused; the sentence must promote an individualised
response to the crime committed that strikes a balance between
the circumstances of the child, the nature of the offence, and the
interests of society; it should promote the reintegration of the
child with its family and community; it should ensure that any
necessary supervision, guidance, treatment or services which
form part of the sentence, support and assist the child in this
reintegration; and the court must also only impose a sentence of
imprisonment as a measure of last resort, and then only for the
shortest appropriate period (para [17]). These sentencing objec-
tives as set out in section 69 of theAct must further be considered
together with the ordinary considerations relating to sentencing,
such as the triad and the aims of punishment (para [17] and see
S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) 540G where the triad is described as
considerations relating to the crime, the offender, and the inter-
ests of society). Other factors and requirements include that the
court first obtain a pre-sentence report from a probation officer,
unless the child has been convicted of a Schedule 1 offence, or
requiring such a report would cause undue delay, in which case
this requirement may be dispensed with (s 71(1) of the Child
Justice Act 75 of 2008).
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With regard to the sentencing options available to a Child
Justice Court, regard must be had to Part 2 of Chapter 10 where
the options are set out in sections 72-79. Section 77 specifically
provides for a sentence of imprisonment (para [14]). When
considering a sentence of imprisonment, section 69(4) of the
Child Justice Act also requires that the court consider: the
seriousness of the offence with due regard to the harm suffered,
risk posed, and the culpability of the offender in causing or
risking the harm; the protection of the community; the severity of
the impact of the offence on the victim; the previous failure of the
child to respond to a non-custodial sentence (if applicable); and
the desirability of keeping the child out of prison (para [19]). It is,
therefore, evident that where a court decides that a sentence of
imprisonment is appropriate under the circumstances, that such
a sentence must reflect all the factors and requirements as set
out in theAct, and the court must also clearly state and justify how
it reached its decision (para [20]).
While the sentencing court in this case attempted to strike a
balance between the circumstances of the appellant, the nature
of the offence, and the interests of society, it did not state whether
it had considered other sentencing options, and also failed to
consider all the factors set out in section 69(4) of the Act (para
[22]). In addition, the sentencing court failed to take into account
the period of time (nine months and 24 days) the appellant had
spent in custody prior to the sentence being imposed (para [23]).
It was accordingly held that the sentence imposed was not in
accordance with the provisions of the Child Justice Act (para
[24]).
In considering an appropriate sentence, Judge Henney noted
that the murder of which the appellant had been convicted was
very serious: he shot the deceased – who was unarmed and
vulnerable – at close range, showed no remorse, and refused to
take responsibility for his actions (para [21]). The appellant also
did not attend school regularly at the place where he was held in
custody prior to sentencing, and his general ‘attitude’ was found
to militate against his reintegration into society (para [25]). A
community-based sentence, or a sentence of correctional super-
vision or placement in a child-and-youth care centre was, there-
fore, not appropriate (paras [26] [27]). The sentence of ten years’
imprisonment on the charge of murder was consequently set
aside and replaced with a term of eight years, which was held to
be the shortest appropriate sentence of direct imprisonment in
this case (paras [31] [32]).
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VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
Mocumie JA, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of
Appeal in Mhlongo v S 2016 (2) SACR 611 (SCA) para [22], said
the following about the importance of victim impact statements:
In S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA) this Court with reference to the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), UN Declaration of the Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, and the Service Charter for
Victims of Crime in South Africa, sent a powerful message on the
importance of a VIS which seems to be disregarded wantonly and
without fear of any repercussions, by the State. A VIS forms an integral
part of the last phase of the trial. It is essential for the court in arriving
at a decision that is fair to the offender, victim and the public at large. It
serves a greater purpose than contributing only to the quantum of
punishment. It generally gives the sentence court a balanced view of
all aspects in order to impose an appropriate sentence. It accommo-
dates the victim more effectively, thus giving her or him a voice and the
only opportunity to participate in the last phase of the trial. Moreover,
the VIS gives the victim the opportunity to say in her or his own voice
how the crime has affected him or her. This is particularly so where no
expert evidence is led by the State to indicate the impact of the crime
on the victim.
The judge further held that a ‘permanent infusion’ of victim
impact statements in the South African criminal justice system is
necessary and can be achieved by way of comprehensive
guidelines, protocols, and model VIS instruments drafted by the
NDPP. He explained that this ‘will address the lackadaisical
manner in which the State treats victims of violent crimes and in
particular, rape. If this is not dealt with decisively, there will soon
come a time when the State will be held accountable for this
failure of its duty by victims of violent, particularly sexual crimes
such as rape’ (para [23]).
PRINCIPLES OF RESENTENCING
The principles of resentencing were restated by Judge Mola-
hlehi for the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria, in Moagi v S
(case A448/2015 [2016] ZAGPPHC 1166, 26 October 2016). The
sentence imposed by the court a quo in this matter was set aside,
as it was vitiated by the fact that the trial court had failed to
forewarn the appellant of the possibility that he may, at the end of
the trial, be faced with a minimum sentence as prescribed in the
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment
Act. Judge Molahlehi J, quoting from Machongo v S (case
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20344/14 [2014] ZASCA 179, 21 November 2014), explained the
process of resentencing as follows (para [20]):
Once the sentence is set aside as a result of the irregularity arising
from failure to forewarn the accused about the minimum sentence
regime, the court then has to conduct the inquiry regarding the
sentence as though the sentence was never imposed by the trial
court. The enquiry as the SCA warned in Machongo, is not that of
comparing or considering whether the sentence of the trial court was
fair and just in the circumstances. The SCA, in that case, explained the
meaning of considering the sentence afresh as follows:
‘Considering a sentence afresh must ineluctably mean, setting
aside of the sentence of the trial court, inter alia, and conducting an
inquiry on the sentence as if it had not been considered before. In
other words, the appeal court must disabuse itself of what the trial
court said in respect of sentence – it must interrogate and adjudi-
cate afresh the triad in respect of sentence as stated in S v Zinn
1969 (2) SA 537 (A) at 540G-H. Its task would be to impose a
sentence which it thinks is suitable in the circumstances, without
comparing it with the one imposed by the trial court. The full court
erred in my view by stating that an appeal court ‘‘will only interfere
when the sentence imposed is vitiated by an irregularity . . . or when
the sentence is shockingly severe, disturbingly inappropriate and
totally out of proportion . . .’’ What the full court did was not
considering the sentence afresh but compared what it had in mind
with what was imposed.’
PAROLE
The decision to grant parole falls within the exclusive domain of
the Department of Correctional Services and courts are generally
hesitant to interfere for fear of violating the principle of separation
of powers, and because courts’ sentencing jurisdiction is strictly
prescribed by statute. For example, a court is not allowed to give
any direction to the parole board in sentencing an accused (see,
for example, S v Motloung 2016 (2) SACR 243 (SCA)). However,
this does not mean that courts are not at times tasked with
considering matters related to parole. The cases discussed
below are examples of the interchange between the judiciary and
the executive with regard to the release of convicted offenders on
parole.
Anon-parole period in terms of section 276B of the Criminal Procedure Act
51 of 1977
Section 276B of the Criminal Procedure Act, which came into
force on 1 October 2004, makes provision for courts, when
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imposing a term of imprisonment for a period of two years or
longer, to fix a period during which the offender shall not be
released on parole. Such a period is referred to as the non-parole
period, and may not exceed two-thirds of the term of imprison-
ment imposed, or twenty-five years, whichever is the shorter.
Such an order for a non-parole period has been described as ‘a
determination in the present for the future behaviour of the person
to be effected thereby. . . . [I]t is an order that a person does not
deserve being released on parole in future’ (Strydom v S (case
20215/2014 [2015] ZASCA 29, 23 March 2015 para [16]). A
non-parole order should, furthermore, be made only in excep-
tional circumstances and upon a proper evidential basis, as a
court will effectively make a prediction with regard to the prob-
able future behaviour of the offender (Jimmale & another v S 2016
(2) SACR 691 (CC) para [13]). A final principle with regard to the
fixing of a non-parole period is that it does not work retrospec-
tively and can, therefore, not be applied to crimes committed
before 1 October 2004 (Mvubu v S (case 518/2016 [2016]
ZASCA 184, 29 November 2016 para [9]; S v Mchunu & another
2013 JDR 2103 (SCA) para [5]).
The Constitutional Court in Jimmale & another v S (above)
considered whether the non-parole period imposed on the appli-
cants in this case was appropriate. The applicants were con-
victed of murder and each sentenced to a term of 25 years’
imprisonment. The trial court also ordered that the accused only
be eligible for parole after having served twenty years of their
respective sentences (para [6]). It was argued on behalf of the
applicants that the trial court had ‘erred grossly in law’ in
imposing the non-parole order for four-fifths of their respective
sentences, and that the non-parole orders infringed on their
rights not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just
cause under section 12(1)(a) of the Constitution (paras [7] [10]).
Judge Nkabinde, writing for the majority of the Constitutional
Court, agreed. In addition to the non-parole period imposed
transgressing the prescribed two-thirds limit of the term of
imprisonment, the applicants in this case had also not been
afforded an opportunity to make submissions in this regard, and
the trial court had also made no findings as to the existence of
exceptional circumstances warranting the imposition of the non-
parole order (para [19]). It was held that courts should generally
allow the parole board and the officials of the Department of
Correctional Services, guided by the Correctional Services Act
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111 of 1998 and the attendant regulations, to make parole
assessments and decisions. A non-parole order should then only
be made when circumstances specifically relevant to parole exist
in addition to aggravating factors pertaining to the commission of
the crime. A proper evidential basis is, furthermore, required for
such an order to be made, and this must be supplemented by
oral argument and submissions by the parties (para [20]).
Also see Makgoba v S case A12/2016 [2016] ZAGPPHC 796,
7 September 2016; Britz v S case 889/2015 [2016] ZASCA 86,
31 May 2016; and Mhlongo v S 2016 (2) SACR 611 (SCA).
Judicial review of a decision by the Minister of Correctional Services
refusing a parole application
On 10 April 1993, the applicant in Walus v Minister of Correc-
tional Services & others (case 41828/2015 [2016] ZAGPPHC 103,
10 March 2016) murdered Chris Hani, then General Secretary of
the South African Communist Party. The applicant was convicted
of murder and sentenced to death on 15 October 1993. His
sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment on
7 November 2000 (para [3]). The applicant had served approxi-
mately 23 years of his sentence, and was 60 years old when his
application to be released on parole was refused by the Minister
of Correctional Services (paras [1]-[4]). In making this decision,
the Minister emphasised the nature of the crime committed by the
applicant and concluded that the time he had spent in prison was
inadequate punishment for his crime (para [15]). The applicant
subsequently applied for this decision to be reviewed on the
basis that the emphasis placed by the Minister on the nature of
the crime and the sentencing in reaching his decision was
unreasonable and irrational (para [14]).
In view of the date on which the applicant had been sentenced,
his parole application had to be considered in terms of the
previous Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959, read together with
the Parole Board Manual (paras [7]-[9]). Judge Janse van
Niewenhuizen for the High Court Gauteng Division, Pretoria,
noted that in Part VI(1A)(15)(b) of the Manual, it is stated that in
considering an application for release on parole, the focus of
punishment shifts with the passing of years, so that more weight
is ultimately attached to rehabilitation rather than punishment
(para [19]). Parole is furthermore itself a form of punishment, in
that it imposes strict conditions on a prisoner released on parole,
and it can be withdrawn should the prisoner not adhere to the
conditions (para [20]).
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In this case, the parole board had recommended the appli-
cant’s case to the Minister for a decision and this was held by
Judge Janse van Niewenhuizen to be a positive factor as it was
‘evident that the parole board applies its mind responsibly after
having considered detailed information from diverse sources’
(para [26]). The court also regarded as an exceptional circum-
stance in this case, the fact that the applicant’s previous applica-
tion for parole had been refused in 2011 by the current Minister’s
predecessor, and it was then recommended that the applicant
attempt to arrange for a ‘Victim Offender Dialogue’ in the spirit of
restorative justice (paras [32]-[34]). Yet, the numerous requests
made since by the applicant to officials from the Department of
Correctional Services to assist him in arranging for a ‘Victim
Offender Dialogue’ had been ignored (paras [36]-[39]). The
current Minister of Correctional Services was fully aware of this
when he made his decision (para [42]). In this regard, Janse van
Niewenhuizen J remarked as follows:
On what basis the Hani family’s refusal to engage with the application
could strengthen the Minister’s decision to refuse the applicant’s
application for parole is difficult to grasp. The applicant has no control
over their decision. It is furthermore disconcerting that the Minister
attaches so much weight to the issue whilst it is not, in terms of the
applicable policies, a factor to be considered when evaluating the
application for parole’ (para [42]).
The judge further regarded this intimation by the Minister as
indicative of what his decision would be if the matter were
referred back to him, and also remarked that it was indicative of
the fact that the Minister would, in all probability, not be able to
apply his mind in an unbiased manner (para [43]). Moreover,
given that the Minister took almost eighteen months to reach a
decision in the present matter, it was clear that the applicant
would suffer further prejudice if the matter was not finalised by the
court (para [45]).
The decision of the Minister of Correctional Services not to
grant the applicant parole was consequently set aside and the
court ordered the applicant to be released on parole within
fourteen days from the date of the court order, subject to the
necessary parole conditions as decided upon by the Minister
(para [47]).
The appeal against this decision by the Minister of Correctional
Services was dismissed in Walus v Minister of Correctional
Services & others (case 41828/2015 [2016] ZAGPPHC 260,
14 April 2016).
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In another case, Ricardo v Minister of Correctional Services &
others (case 32623/2014 [2016] ZAGPJHC 66, 3 February 2016),
the applicant, a prisoner serving a term of life imprisonment for
murder, sought to have the recommendation made by the
National Council for Correctional Services and approved by the
Minister of Correctional Services not to grant him parole, set
aside (para [1]). As with the case discussed immediately above,
the previous Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959 also applied in
this case. And, in terms of a policy directive under this previous
legislative framework, a prisoner serving a sentence of life
imprisonment was eligible to be released on parole once he or
she had served a period of thirteen years and four months of his
or her sentence, notwithstanding the provisions in the legislation
requiring that a period of twenty years be served before the
Minister could consider releasing such a prisoner on parole (para
[2]).
The applicant appeared before the Correctional Supervision
and Parole Board in October 2013 and his case was thereafter
considered by the National Council for Correctional Services. The
Council recommended to the Minister that the applicant not be
released on parole, and that the following three requirements be
satisfied before 2016 – an intervening period of 24 months before
the applicant’s parole could again be considered – the applicant
had to continue participating in the Gang Management Strategy;
he was to be encouraged and assisted to develop academic
and/or practical skills to enable him to compete in the labour
market upon his release; and thirdly, when the matter of the
applicant’s parole was again brought before the National Council
for Correctional Services, it had to be accompanied by the
profiles of the applicant’s accomplices (para [7]).
However, the prison where the applicant was held did not offer
a Gang Management Strategy programme, and the applicant
was never transferred to another facility that would have made it
possible for him to participate in such a programme (paras
[12]-28]). With regard to the second requirement, it was noted
that the applicant had completed all conceivable courses avail-
able to him in prison, and that he submitted an ‘endless’ number
of certificates to demonstrate that he would be able to compete in
the job market. It was not clear, therefore, what further academic
or training programmes the National Council for Correctional
Services and the Minister of Correctional Services wished the
applicant to complete (paras [29]-[41]).
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In accepting the recommendation by the National Council for
Correctional Services, the Minister of Correctional Services also
stated an additional condition: that the applicant participate in
‘Restorative Justice Processes involving the family of the victims
as well as the community’ (para [42]). Regarding this condition,
Judge Satchwell for the High Court, Gauteng Local Division,
Johannesburg, said the following,
. . . the respondents have taken no steps at all to implement any of the
possibilities which may be available in any restorative justice pro-
gramme. They claim ignorance of any such steps and then seek to
penalise the applicant for their ignorance. If any restorative justice is
desired by victims or their families or the community it is hardly
possible for the applicant to go and visit the victims or hold a town hall
meeting or devise a programme. Respondents are absolutely silent on
what could or should be done and who should do it and when or how.
No direction is given to [the] applicant. . . . It may be, of course, that
none of the victims or their families wish to participate in any
restorative justice programme. That is their right. They are not obliged
to interact with, meet with, communicate or engage with – and
certainly not to forgive – the offender. And no burden should ever be
placed on such a victim that he or she is responsible for the continuing
incarceration of the offender (paras [45]-[47]).
While Judge Satchwell was loathe simply to bypass the care-
fully charted chain of command or consideration and decision-
making with regard to parole (ie, the Case Management
Committee, the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board, the
National Council for Correctional Services, and the Minister of
Correctional Services), she also held that this matter required the
intervention of the court, as a man was seeking his release on
parole and continued to be incarcerated because the require-
ments to be fulfilled were ‘impossibilities set up by the authorities
as hurdles which he cannot overcome’ (paras [54] [55]). The
relevant role-players in the applicant’s application for release on
parole were consequently directed to give their earliest possible
consideration to the applicant’s parole application (para [60]).
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